circumstances ('promissory secession'); and following a positive vote in an independence referendum or its functional equivalent ('democratic secession').
In cases of serious human rights abuses following the exclusion of one part of the population from the political process, a number of authors identify a remedial right of secession through a reverse reading of the so-called 'saving clause' in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, 14 and the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign and independent State.
Whether parties, and that the way in which the parties engaged with the process would influence the question of recognition by outside States. 18 In other words, the (internal) promise made by the State government (expressly or impliedly) to engage in a process leading to independence may well create (external) international law obligations opposable to the territorial State.
The third possibility is to recognize that a positive vote in support of independence in a valid referendum can create an international law right of secession for politically ineffective peoples ('democratic secession'). The mainstream international law position holds that the right of peoples to self-determination does not accord a right to statehood, even when there is a democratic vote for independence or its functional equivalent. 19 Certain writers claim, however, that a vote for independence is not irrelevant in the process of creating States. 20 Reflecting on recent events in Crimea, Anne Peters concludes that contemporary international law moves towards the position of requiring that all territorial realignments should be justified by democratic means, preferably through a territorial referendum. 21 There is then a emergent literature highlighting the relevance of democratic decisions-making by the affected population in determining the future of any territory.
How then are we to resolve the differences of scholarly opinion on the possibilities for statehood for politically ineffective peoples? In dealing with the problems that face the discipline, international lawyers often rely on abstract models of the international system, and they consider that these models should not only, or not merely, be of theoretical interest, but also helpful in answering the practical questions that face the discipline. 22 The dominant way in which international lawyers have modelled the State has been by reference to the idea of State as Person, which explains the reliance on birth to describe the emergence of new States. 23 The International Court of Justice has, for example, referred to the 'birth of so many new States'. 24 The as an independent political community, organization in a particular territory, under a coercive system of government under the rule of law, which is not subject to the authority of any other political entity. State, in other words, is imagined as the coevolved and coexistent systems of law and politics, where the politics system is understood in terms of the adoption of collectively binding decisions that will be coercively enforced. This understanding is generally reflected (albeit expressed in different terms) in the international law literature and forms the basis of the Montevideo formula that defines 'State'.
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Systems theory thinking
The argument from general systems theory is that we can think of any collection of interacting objects, actors or agents as a 'system', and that all systems have certain shared characteristics, whether we are looking at the Solar System or Criminal Justice System. The objective in both cases is to observe, frame and explain the patterned behaviours of the objects, actors or agents in the system. Given its focus on relationships between actors or agents, systems theory thinking has proved influential in developing our understandings of the functioning of human social systems. A variant developed by Niklas Luhmann (autopoiesis), which focuses on communications, has resonated with a number of legal academic, given its conceptualization of 'law' as a self-producing system of law communications. Luhmann's closed systems theory imagines world society as a system of self-creating, self-maintaining and self-organizing -autopoietic -systems of communication.
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These social systems are distinguished from the background noise of world society by virtue of the fact that each has its own functional specialism and its own binary coding that provides a positive and a negative value and through which the system creates its own understanding of the world from a perspective that is internal to the system. 29 The only relevant perspective is that of the system and the only relevant observer is the system.
Examples of autopoietic social systems include the law system, the politics system, the economic system, science, the education system, and the media. Systems of the same type may have different programmes, but each will have the same binary code. Law and politics 27 (n 7). 28 The argument is self-evidently not a literal description of the world, but a way of modelling the complexities of human social existence by drawing on insights from science: autopoietic social systems of communication are self-creating, self-organizing, and self-reproducing -just like biochemical systems (the standard example is the biological cell). 29 complex) systems could not be understood in this reductionist way. It is not possible, for example, to understand an ecosystem (the patterned behaviour of organisms within a particular space) simply by examining its constituent elements. The properties of chaotic and complex systems were seen to be the result of the behaviours of the individual components,
and their interactions with each other, and their interactions with the environment outside of the system: the whole (of the system) was 'greater than the sum of its parts'.
Chaos theory observes that the elements of certain systems, the weather is the standard example, sometimes combine to produce unpredictable consequences and that small inputs can have disproportionately large outputs (non-linearity) -the, so-called, Butterfly effect, whereby the weather in Texas can be influenced by the flapping of the wings of a butterfly in
Brazil. Both chaos and complexity have in common the idea that the patterned behaviour of a 'system' can be the result of a relatively simple set of laws followed by a large number of constituent agents. In chaos theory, those laws produce unpredictable outcomes and the system is highly sensitive to its original condition. In complexity, the actions and interactions of agents result in complex patterned behaviour at the edge of chaos: the place between entropy (where the system decays) and chaos (too much activity). The problem for the science of complexity is that complex systems cannot be modelled accurately because they cannot be simplified without losing some of their complexity. Any reductive description fails then to capture the full complexity and adaptability of the system, or loses some important element, meaning that predictions of the future shape and form of complex systems become impossible to make with any certainty.
Complexity is more firmly established in the natural sciences, where it has been applied, for example, to ecosystems and the brain. The insights from complexity have also been applied 
Complex adaptive systems
The dynamic character of a complex system is provided by the facts of emergence and selforganization. Emergence reflects the idea that patterned behaviour is a consequence of the actions of individual components following certain rules; self-organization that patterned behaviour is not the result of some central controller or guiding hand, but a consequence of individual agents responding to the unpredictability of emergence in a search for stability.
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The capacity for self-organisation allows complex systems to change their internal structures in response to developments within the system and events in the external environment. The structure of the system (the positions, actions and reactions of agents) occurs spontaneously as the result of the interactions of the parts of the system as they react to the flow of information through the system: there is no central controller or guiding hand in a complex system. The capacity for self-organization is the property of a complex system that enables it to process and make sense of information in order to develop or change in response to changes in the environment.
Emergence is the key attribute of complexity. The patterns observed in a complex systems are the result of the actions and interactions of networks of agents. It is important to be clear that emergence is not random patterned behaviour: emergence reflects the idea that the interactions between the component agents and their interactions with actors outside the system and the wider environment can produce unexpected consequences. This is particularly the case as complex systems are non-linear: small inputs can have disproportionately large effects (the Butterfly effect), and an apparently stable system can change suddenly in unpredictable ways. Emergence is, then, focused on the properties of the system that cannot be deduced from examining the component elements.
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The basic components of a complex adaptive system are called agents. The term refers to actors able to respond to other agents and to the external environment. The key point is that agents are, to some degree, autonomous, whilst operating in accordance with certain rules.
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When agents 'react' they do so in a thinking way, based on a collective memory contained within the system. Complex systems learn through the processing of information by agents and the presence of negative and positive feedback loops. Complex systems are also learning systems. This is an emergent property of the system: as the interactions of agents create new patterns in response to new information, the system can be said to have 'learnt' and adapted and evolved. In order to adapt, evolve and change -and not simply 'mirror' its environment, the system must have a memory, and therefore a history. 36 Learning is not possible without some form of memory that contains information important to the existence of the system, which is stored and dispersed throughout the system (even the most simple social animal must be able to distinguish friend from foe). The history of the system helps to determine its structure, representing the memory of the system of the processes of self-organization that resulted in its extant structure and processes. That memory also constrains the system's possible futures: the idea of path dependency.
As well as co-operating and competing with other agents within their locale, agents may be influenced directly by external actors and elements. In other words, complex systems are open systems. This makes the identification of the boundaries of a complex system particularly problematic. Take the example of the paradigmatic complex system: a rainforest ecosystem.
As a result of the incompressibility (a complex system cannot be simplified without losing some element that makes them complex) and openness of the system (agents in the ecosystem sometimes interact directly with elements in the external environment), any description of the rainforest ecosystem and its boundaries inevitably involves the making of Complex systems have the following characteristics: agents follow rules, but act with some autonomy; agents are in a network of relationships; the patterned behaviours of agents can be framed as a system; system characteristics are not derived only from the actions of agents; agents act and react, relying on information within and outside system; the system therefore evolves without any guiding hand; system memory constrains future possibilities. The argument here is that systems of law and politics can be understood as complex systems and modelled as patterned communications between authorities and subjects. Consider the law system. Law is self-organizing: there is no central controller or guiding hand -neither the legislature or supreme court is able to control the shape and form of the entire system. The law system is the emergent, undirected, pattern of normative communications framed in terms of law adopted by authorities and applied to subjects. It is the result of the communicative actions of a large network of agents (legislatures, courts, judges, lawyers, Modelling 'State' as complex systems of law and politics
The concept of State is understood by international lawyers in terms of coevolved and coexistent law and politics systems: an independent political community under a coercive system of government under the rule of law, which is not subject to the authority of any other political entity. The insight from complexity is that these law and politics systems are emergent, undirected systems. How, then, do we model 'State' against the background noise of world society in conditions of complexity? The first requirement is to separate each system from the environment of world society. The idea of a complex system presupposes the existence of a boundary that distinguishes 'system' and 'not-system'. If we understand world society in terms of communications, we can observe patterns of communications that we would recognize as 'law' and 'politics'. We can, further, frame networked communications as law systems and politics systems. The boundaries of these systems are not, however, to be understood as enjoying an 'objective' reality, or as being established only by the operations of the system (in contradistinction to autopoiesis). Boundaries are simultaneously a function of the activity of the system (there must be patterned behaviour that can be observed) and the product of the strategy of description involved in the act of observation when separating the system from its environment.
Any description of a complex system involves the making of choices by those observing the system. Different observers may frame the patterned communications differently, depending on their strategic and cognitive frames: constitutional lawyers see domestic law norms;
international lawyers see international law norms, for example. Where there is more than one observer, there may be multiple perspectives on the existence and scope of the system (and no reason to conclude that each observer will see the same version of the system) or to prefer one version or vision of the system and its boundary to another. It is then difficult to be absolutely certain of the position of the boundaries of law and politics systems in world society. Importantly, there are no objective boundaries -the act of framing involves the making of choices -and it is impossible for the observer to avoid the responsibility of choosing, i.e. deciding which norms are inside the system and which norms are outside the system. Once we recognize that law and politics are complex systems, we must reject (as an observed reality) the argument that a political entity (understood as the coevolved and coexistent systems of law and politics) capable of establishing its independence with the will to be a State is a State. State is not a fact of the world simpliciter: it is fact of the world observed through the cognitive frame of international law.
In the identification of new States, the following insights from complexity theory emerge.
First, there must be patterned communications. Complex systems are not merely a function of observation. We must be able to see co-emergent and coexistent systems of law and politics.
Second, there must be an observer to distinguish the patterned communications of the law and politics systems from the background noise of world society. This is done through the framing of communications of the same type, that is by framing the pattern of law communications coded lawful/ unlawful (or law/ non-law) issued by authorities to subjects and the pattern of communications issued by the government to the governed on collective biding decisions that will be coercively enforced. It follows that the 'existence' of the complex systems of law and politics is both a function of the system (reflected in patterned communications) and the act of observation. Third, given the inherent indeterminacy in the modelling and observation of complex systems, there may be multiple perspectives on the system and its boundary, and no reason to privilege the perspective of one observer over any other.
State, following the logic of complexity, is the observation of the patterned communications of the coevolved and coexistent law and politics systems. Where the law system and politics system are observed to be coexistent, then, according to the Montevideo formula, the territory subject to the normative communications of the law and politics systems has a prima facie claim to be a noise of world society. This is achieved through the identification of communications systems by observing their function and binary coding. The law system is the pattern of normative communications coded lawful/not-lawful, which are promulgated by recognized authorities and applied to subjects. This definition is clearly contestable, but, for the most part, controversies in relation to the international status of a political entity do not concern the question as to whether it has a system of 'law' -although this point has been central to arguments before the European Court of Human Rights as to whether the de facto regime of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a sovereign political entity. 46 The focus, then, is on the politics system -as observed by State and non-state actors in the international community.
From the time of Hugo Grotius, it has been accepted that the overall approach of the international law system to the regulation of world society emerges through the exercise of Sovereigns' wills, i.e. there is no guiding hand (international law is the paradigmatic complex law system). In the period since the adoption of the United Nations Charter, that emergent 45 teleology has undergone a process of transformation, in part through the recognition of the right of peoples to political self-determination, but also in the adoption of numerous international human rights law instruments, indicating a move away from the Hobbesian notion of the politics system as coercively binding decisions, to politics as a system of legitimate authority accepted by subjects. Legitimate political authority is manifested in the adoption of positive laws accepted (unthinkingly) by subjects. To be accepted by subjects, authority systems must develop, and act in a manner consistent with, a legitimation narrative.
Without this, government is nothing more that the exercise of naked power.
The idea of practical authority developed by Joseph Raz explains the way in which the legitimating narratives of political authorities function. This account of practical authority relies on four inter-related theses: the dependence thesis, which provides that authority is legitimate where undertaken in accordance with the reasons that already apply to subjects;
pre-emption thesis -the directives of legitimate authorities establish content-independent reasons for action; normal justification thesis, which establishes that the exercise of normative power is only legitimate where the authority is better placed than subjects to establish regulatory directives; and independence thesis -on some issues it will be more important for individuals to decide for themselves than to decide correctly. The key is the normal justification thesis. Raz argues that the normal way of establishing authority is to demonstrate to the subjects of authority directives accept that they would better conform to the reasons that (already) apply to them by following the directives of the authority than by acting independently. 47 The reasons for accepting the authority of another include that the authority is more knowledgeable; is more likely to make a correct decision; and accepting the authority of another allows for effective co-ordination. Once established, the directives of a legitimate authority are binding on those subjects within its jurisdiction.
The requirement for practical authority is a consequence of the identification of coordination and collective action problems by a number of individuals. It follows that before an actor, institution or system can satisfy the normal justification criterion (i.e. regulate in the interests of subjects), it must be recognized or accepted as an authority by a large number of persons who do actually accept that the relevant actor, institution or system satisfies the 47 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 53.
normal justification criterion in cases of co-ordination over matters of common concern.
The exercise of normative power by the State is, then, legitimate where the State is more likely than the individual to establish a social norm or convention that regulates the behaviour of the individual and others in accordance with the background reasons that already apply to the subjects of authority directives taken individually. Where the individual subjects accept the authority of the politics system of the State, the system is an authority for them.
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Raz' account of the justification for authority establishes a significant break with the social contract tradition that has dominated the discourse around legitimate political power.
Authority is not established at some hypothetical foundational moment of agreement that binds subsequent generations. According to Raz' account, subjects will only accept the authority of the regime where it governs, or at least claims to govern, in their interests at this point in time. The only reasons that an authority may take into account in determining the content of authority directives are those that already apply to actually existing subjects, including the requirement for co-operation on a wide range of issues -and that subjects recognize this is the case. Raz' idea of practical authority allows us to develop a model a democratic secession in three related steps: 49 first, the rejection of the sovereign authority of the territorial State by certain subjects; second, the acceptance of the authority of the emergent, undirected, systems of law and politics coupled under the constitution of a new political entity; and, finally, the observation (or 'recognition') of the political entity as possessing legitimate political authority in relation to its 'subjects'.
(
1) The rejection of the authority of the State
Legitimate political authority depends on the development of a narrative by the politics system -and the acceptance of that narrative by the subjects of the regime taken 48 In the case of the political authorities of the State, Raz concludes that the requirement to solve co-ordination problems means that they should be in a position of 'real power', i.e. de jure political authorities should also be de facto authorities, and that this will require the use of coercive force to ensure compliance with authority directives: Joseph Raz, 'The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception' (2006) 90 Minnesota Law Review 1003, 1036. 49 Compare, however, Raz' well known position recognizing a collective right to self-determination for those (ethno-cultural) groups that provide secure identity and belonging to members. The objective is to secure the necessary conditions for the prosperity and self-respect of the group. The right to self-determination is limited only by the requirement that the encompassing group commit itself to the protection of basic human rights and exercises its right to self-determination in a manner that limits any damage to already existing States: Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, 'National self-determination ' (1990) Whilst it would be naïve not to recognize the potential dangers to peace and human security in accepting a democratic right of secession (and likewise in the repression of separatist movements -the opposing empirical, risk-based consideration), the burden of proof, as Kai Nielsen observes, is on those arguing that the moral right of democratic secession should be overridden. 56 To put it another way: the burden rests with those seeking to justify the imposition of coercive governmental authority on unwilling subjects. By way of contradistinction, the argument here follows the logic of legitimate political authority: the State must govern in the interests of subjects and develop a legitimation narrative to explain how it is governing in their interests -and the subjects of the politics system must recognize that this is the case. Where the subjects of the politics system do not accept that this is the case, then the State is not an authority for them. The decision to accept or reject the authority of the State is one for each individual targeted by the authority directives of the State. The choice cannot be made by others, especially not by a majority of the subjects of the regime. This ability to accept or reject the authority of the State operates on a simple binary divide. Where a subject accepts the authority of the coevolved and coexistent systems of law and politics, the State is an authority for them. Where they do not, the State is not an authority. 57 It is, then, possible for a number of subjects to reject the authority of a government that enjoys legitimate authority in relation to other parts of the population. The basis for this lies in the rejection of the legitimation narrative developed by the constitutional State: nothing more is required.
(2) The establishment of a new de facto authorities
There are three circumstances in which the idea of legitimate authority allows for the subjects of the State to be released from the bonds of authority. First, where the State has undergone a process of dissolution, for example in the case of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In these exceptional circumstances, there is factually no politics system claiming authority over the subjects of the State -in other words, there is an authority vacuum that can be filled by other systems of authority. Second, where the State make no pretence to govern in the interests of some or all of the population, the government is not an authority for the relevant subjects. Third, any subject of an authority regime can reject the legitimation narrative of the politics system as it is applied to them -subjects can create an authority vacuum in relation to themselves.
Within the unoccupied governance space created by the loss of authority of the territorial State, it is possible for subjects to recognize and accept emergent systems of law and politics under a new constitution: this is the way in which constituent power is exercised by subjects.
Whilst the acceptance (or rejection) of authority is a question for the individual, the establishment of authorities must be seen as a collective endeavour, as the requirement for 57 The argument applies both to the fact of authority and the scope of authority. practical authorities follows the identification of co-ordination and collective action problems by a group of individuals. Given that Raz' conception of practical authority concerns the exercise of normative power in relation to individuals capable of deciding whether, and on what grounds, they should accept a claim to authority (i.e. it concerns subjects capable of understanding and responding to arguments supported by reasons), the collective determination to accept a new authority must logically be undertaken on the basis of reasoned deliberation. This applies both as between the authority and subjects, and between subjects themselves: the determination to establish or recognize an authority follows a collective act of political will-formation grounded in reasoned public deliberations in which all voices count equally.
In practical politics, the determination by a group of persons to establish an authority regime has an international law right to political self-determination now understood as a presumptive claim to statehood, opposable to the territorial State, which must engage with the separatist territory, in a meaningful way, in order to facilitate its right to political self-determination, understood as sovereign independence, or some other status acceptable to a majority of the population. The obligation on the State to facilitate the right of peoples to political selfdetermination is owed both to the relevant population and to all other States in international community, erga omnes.
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The international law obligation of the State to engage with the separatist territory cannot be understood as according a right to statehood. State is the observed fact of coexistent law and politics systems, where the politics system is framed in terms of communications on collectively binding decisions that will be coercively enforced. In the absence of de facto coercive power over the subjects of the politics system, an entity does not have a claim to statehood.
The right of a people that has voted for independence is the right to a process leading to the 
